The impact of the European sovereign debt crisis on the  recovering  from the financial  crisis: Equity returns of the banking sector by Duque, Madalena Santos Ribeiro Vieira
 
A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Master Degree 
in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics 
 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS ON THE 
RECOVERING FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS – EQUITY RETURNS OF THE 
BANKING SECTOR 
 
 
 
MADALENA SANTOS RIBEIRO VIEIRA DUQUE 508 
 
 
 
A Project carried out on the Financial Markets Major, under the supervision of 
Professor Paulo M. M. Rodrigues 
 
 
January 2014 
2 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS ON THE RECOVERING FROM THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS – EQUITY RETURNS OF THE BANKING SECTOR 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses, through a dynamic panel data model, the impact of the Financial and 
the European Debt crisis on the equity returns of the banking system. The model is also 
extended to specifically investigate the impact on countries who received rescue 
packages. The sample under analysis considers eleven countries from January 2006 to 
June 2013. The main conclusion is that there was in fact a structural change in banks’ 
excess returns due to the outbreak of the European Debt Crisis, when stock markets were 
still recovering from the Financial Crisis of 2008. 
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1 Introduction  
“The recent crisis that developed from a global banking crisis in the summer of 2007 to a 
European sovereign debt crisis since 2010 is one of the most challenging episodes for 
policy makers both at government and central banks since the introduction of the euro” 
(Alter and Beyer, 2013, page 4). Many theories have offered potential explanations about 
how financial crisis develop and how these can be prevented. However, periods of serious 
turmoil continue to happen from time to time.  
In fact, the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 has been considered the worst financial crisis 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The weakness of financial institutions globally 
can be pointed out as one of the major consequences of such trouble conditions. Although 
the crisis originated in North America, with the burst of the U.S. housing bubble in 2007, 
it rapidly spread to the rest of the world. Among its causes, one can point out the huge 
growth of the housing bubble and the associated subprime lending; a flood of 
irresponsible credit to consumers; fraudulent underwriting practices; deregulation (in the 
sense that the regulatory framework has not accompanied the financial complexity and 
innovation); predatory lending; over-indebtedness; and incorrect measure of risk. In the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, authorities and central banks adopted severe measures, 
either through fiscal stimulus or austerity plans. 
When the banking sector worldwide finally began to see its stock prices recover, Europe 
was hit by serious problems concerning the amount of sovereign debt (see figure 1). The 
recession of 2008-2012 had created favourable and undesired conditions for a scenario of 
simultaneous banking crisis, governments’ debt crisis and a competitiveness crisis. As 
the ability to repay and refinance government debt in European countries increased, a 
currency crisis was established, leading to sovereign defaults. The tightening nexus 
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established within world economies, mostly due to the globalization process of the last 
century, also exposed non-European economies to this Eurozone crisis. 
 
Figure 1 – Banking Sector Equity Indices. Data source: Datastream. 
 
To a certain extent, the most affected European nations (such as Greece, Ireland, Italy and 
Portugal) found themselves in a position where they were neither unable to repay nor to 
finance their governments’ debt. It was in the beginning of 2010 that the first country in 
the analysis (Greece) recognized urgent need for international support. When asking for 
external help, those nations committed themselves to an agreement with and established 
by “Troika” 1, in exchange for financial support. Meanwhile, the European Central Bank 
(ECB) sought to ease the crisis’s impact. In order to ensure that money flows were not 
freezing, the ECB provided cheap loans to European banks and lowered interest rates. 
                                                          
1 “Troika” is the tripartite committee led by the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank 
(ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The entity has been providing financial assistance to 
governments of countries in trouble, such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus. The financial support 
measures consist in the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), among others.   
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Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal have been the most worrisome countries regarding 
liquidity problems. 
The main goal of this paper is to study if there was in fact a structural change in banks’ 
equity returns when both financial and sovereign debt crisis hit. Aside from answering 
that question, I will then study the impact of the EU Emergency Measures (i.e., rescue 
loans) received by four Euro-member countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) on 
equity returns of their banking systems. Although the causes of such serious crises differ 
from country to country, the feedback loop between domestic sovereign creditworthiness 
and domestic banks are evident in all of the European States. The systematic risk coming 
from this growing interdependence between banking systems and sovereigns highlights 
the usefulness of analysing the factors that influence the rise and fall of bank returns. 
Even more in a scenario of crisis, as the one we are living nowadays.    
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a brief literature 
review.  Section 3 explains the methodology and the details of the model. Section 4 
presents the estimation results and section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Literature Review 
There is a vast range of literature on the Financial Crisis and European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis. Many studies were conducted to explain the causes and consequences of these two 
successive events, as well as their impact on equity returns of the banking sector. In order 
to be clearer, this section is divided into three major topics: i) What has been affecting 
banking sector’s performance?; ii) From financial crash to European sovereign debt 
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crisis; and iii) The impact of the European debt problems in equity returns of the banking 
sector. 
i) What has been affecting banking sector performance? 
One of the most important drivers of bank returns of advanced economies is the funding 
conditions prevailing at the time. There are different channels whereby the worsening of 
sovereign creditworthiness jeopardize banks funding conditions. First of all, bank losses 
that took place since the subprime crisis have exasperated banks’ balance sheets, 
increasing therefore the cost of funding and decreasing the leeway of doing that. The same 
losses lead to a reduction in the value of banks’ collateral, undermining the wholesale 
funding and conditioning their ability in getting liquidity from the respective central 
banks. Also, the negative spillovers from sovereigns to the banking sector have 
contributed to the downgrade of domestic banks rating. In that way, rating agency news 
have powerful impacts in determining banking funding conditions. In the recent past, 
several rating downgrades have increased the costs of funding and the access to 
international markets was, almost automatically, damaged (see Arezki, Candelon and Sy, 
2011 and Alter and Beyer, 2013).  Another channel of impact is related to the reduction 
of funding benefits that banks obtain by government guarantees – even more in European 
countries, where governments are no longer capable of avoiding bank failures, 
notwithstanding the fear of a negative systematic risk coming from it.  
Additionally, Chan-Lau, Liu and Schmittmann (2012) show that changes in both growth 
prospects and sovereign risk had a strong impact on the behaviour of equity returns, 
especially from 2008 onwards. The authors pointed out that “a deterioration of the 
economic outlook hurts a country’s repayment capacity raising its sovereign debt. Losses 
in bond holdings decrease banks’ ability to provide credit, further damaging the growth 
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outlook, and to continue buying sovereign debt, leading to higher sovereign spreads that 
affect the country’s ability to serve its debt”. Once again, the feedback loop between 
sovereigns and banks is evident. 
Regarding the performance of the banking sector in adverse economic conditions, there 
are a lot of factors that help explaining why some banks performed better than others. 
Accordingly to the same article by Chan-Lau, Liu and Schmittmann (2012), European 
banks more reliant on wholesale funding, measured by the loan-to-deposit ratio, tend to 
perform poorly. Its short-term conditions increase the likelihood of funding shortages, 
when market uncertainty is established (Duffie 2010, and Gorton and Metrick 2010). On 
the contrary, deposits seem to be a stable source of funds, helping banks protecting 
themselves in crisis episodes. Moreover, higher capitalization (measured as the equity to 
asset ratio) and lower leverage make banks’ equity returns less vulnerable to euro area 
crisis episodes (Chan-Lau, Liu and Schimttmann, 2012). Surprisingly, banks located in 
countries with more power regulation had worse stock returns during the euro crisis 
episodes. It is not to say that governance is bad for banks’ performance, but the attributes 
that market rewarded in 2006 to increase shareholders’ wealth, for instance, implied too 
many risks that lead to huge costs when the crisis hit; see Beltratti and Stulz (2009).  
ii) From financial crash to European sovereign debt crisis 
Ureche-Rangau and Burietz (2012) presented direct empirical evidence for the link 
between the financial crisis and the current European sovereign debt crisis. The subprime 
crisis started in 2007 with a real state crisis. This period was dominated by many bank 
runs, accompanied by several bank failures. The simultaneous process of sequential 
increases in interest rates and decreases in house prices led to colossal default rates on 
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subprime mortgages. Banks’ exposure to financial market problems was creating serious 
concerns. 
In order to avoid market panic and restore people’s confidence, governments saw 
themselves in the duty to limit the bust and consequences phase. Providing public 
financing was the first step taken, leading to a colossal increase of the sovereign debt and 
its cost. That is why one may say that the financial crash was one of the main drivers of 
the current sovereign problems. Meanwhile, many rescue plans were put in practice, 
contributing to an even higher level of sovereign debts. Those financial packages (capital 
injections, liquidity provisions, guarantees, among others) had serious consequences and 
since 2010, governments have faced troubles in refunding their own debt (see Ureche-
Rangau and Burietz, 2012). 
In more detail, the period between January 2007 and September 2008 was defined by the 
banking crisis, when banks’ Credit Default Swap (CDS) increased sharply, and sovereign 
CDS remained stable. Then, from September 2008 and October 2008, the implementation 
of the aforementioned rescue plans helped in reducing banks CDS, but through the cost 
of sovereign CDS increases. From October 2008 onwards, banks’ difficulties became 
even more serious and, simultaneously, governments’ debt was getting riskier (Ureche-
Rangau and Burietz, 2012).   
iii) The impact of the European debt problems in equity returns of the banking 
sector 
During financial crisis, the consequences of a sovereign creditworthiness deterioration on 
the banking system turn even more dynamic. As Alter and Beyer (2013) noticed, 
“Sovereign debt amplification feeds back into the financial sector by affecting balance 
sheets of financial institutions and thereby having a negative impact on domestic banks’ 
9 
 
ratings that pushes up their funding costs, see e.g. BIS (2011)”. The same article also 
shows that the individual contagion risk from countries that have implemented rescue 
plans is very high in the time preceding those programs, decreasing significantly shortly 
after. For instance, after the implementation of rescue packages in Greece, Portugal and 
Ireland, spillover risks from those countries were partially mitigated.  
Chan-Lau, Liu and Schimttmann (2012) compare the two crises periods: 2006-2008 and 
2009-2010. Their analysis reveals that the impact of the Euro-periphery sovereign stress 
measure had a much higher impact in the second period. This might occur since the focus 
on sovereign exposures was boosted once the European Banking Authority (EBA) started 
performing stress tests and important data became available to markets.  
Besides the direct link with the tightening nexus between sovereigns and banks 
aforementioned, there is also a channel through which high government debts affects 
banks’ equity value. Every so often, and in a context of high debt levels, governments 
have no alternative but to increase taxes or decrease public spending. As a chain reaction, 
economic growth falls. The amount of non-performing loans increases and asset prices 
fall, automatically hurting both asset quality and capitalization of banks2 (Poeck and 
Wijffelaars, 2012). 
Credit rating agencies also play a fundamental role in this downward spiral both across 
countries and financial markets, essentially focused in more troubled countries like  
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (see Arezki, Candelon and Sy, 2011)3. Accordingly,  
                                                          
2 Accordingly to Poeck and Wijffelaars (2012), “even if high debt does not lead to fiscal consolidation it 
hampers growth through high interest expenditure which crowds out expenditure that could benefit 
growth”. 
3 The sign and magnitude of the impact of credit rating downgrades in a specific country depends on 
different factors. One can highlight the characteristics of the announcement, the individual economic and 
financial conditions of that country and the rating agency that states the announcement (see Poeck and 
Wijffelaars, 2012). 
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“downgrades to near speculative grade ratings for relatively large economies such as 
Greece have a systematic spillover effects across Euro zone countries” (Arezki, Candelon 
and Sy, 2011), rising sovereign bond and CDS spreads, while increasing pressures on 
stock markets4.  One should notice that such feedback loop (related with the effect of 
sovereign spreads on banks’ balance sheets) greatly threatens governments capacity of 
recapitalizing those banks after a banking crisis event (Poeack and Wijffelaars, 2012).  
3 Model and Data 
In order to study the impact of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis in the recovery of 
bank equity returns from the Great Recession of 2008-2012, I have defined a panel data 
regression. Eleven countries were included in this study: the United Kingdom, Japan, 
Spain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the United States of America, Portugal, Greece 
and Ireland. Besides the inclusion of two dummies representing the aforementioned 
crises, other macro variables were taken into consideration.  
The sample of monthly data under analysis starts in January 2006 and ends in June 2013. 
The starting date was chosen in order to cover both the beginning and the pike of the 
financial crisis (in 2008), whereas the end of the interval was dictated by data availability.  
Data was collected from different sources, such as Bloomberg, Datastream, OECD, 
Banco de Portugal and Eurostat. To perform the required econometric computations, I 
used the program STATA.5. The following equation describes the panel data regression  
                                                          
4 In the case of Greece, a rating downgrade by Fitch in December 2009 (from A- to BBB+) had a 
significance and negative spillover effect across European member-states. For instance, a 0,17% increase 
in Greek CDS spreads and a 0.05% increase in Irish CDS spreads (Arezki, Bertrand and Sy, 2011). 
5 To estimate my model, I used the Arellano- Bond dynamic panel-data estimation, with robust standard 
errors, in order to deal with heteroskedasticity. After the model was built, the Wooldridge test was 
performed to endorse that we were not in the presence of serial correlation. Details are presented in the 
book “Microeconometrics using STATA”.  
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estimated to carry out the analysis: 
Bank Excess Returnsit = β 0 + β1CDSit + β2PMIit + β3OISit + β4VIXit + β5IPit +  
 
 
  
 
+ β6TradeJapan-EUi,t + β7TradeEU-USit + β8Financial_crisis + β9EUSovdebt_crisis + εit 
 
 
Equation (1)  
where: 
i=1, 2, … , 11 corresponds to each of the eleven countries 
t=1,2,.. 89 corresponds to months starting in February 2006 and ending in June 2013. 
 
Notice that, to overcome nonstationarity problems all explanatory variables are expressed 
in first differences. Moreover, all data was converted to Euros. 
Bank Excess Returns (Bank Excess Returns) 
The dependent variable is the Bank Excess Equity Returns of the different eleven 
countries under consideration. It was computed from the bank stock indices extracted 
from Datastream. After doing the appropriate transformation from prices to returns, I 
subtracted the risk free rate proxy to obtain the excess equity return series. According to 
Chan-Lau, Liu and Schmittmann (2012), the 1-month Euro Overnight Index average 
swap rate (EONIA) seems to be the most suitable risk free6 proxy. 
 
                                                          
6 EONIA swap is the most liquid rate in euro money markets and it less disturbed by counterparty risk. 
German bonds yields could also have been used as a proxy for the risk free rate, although they could be 
affected by worries about potential need of help by Germany to European countries. See Chan-Lau, Liu 
and Schimttmann, 2012. 
Sovereign Risk 
GDP Outlook 
Funding Conditions 
Investor Sentiment 
Economic Health 
Commercial Wealth 
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Credit Default Swap spread (CDS) 
The variable Credit Default Swap, as an insurance against non-payment, is presented in 
the model to measure the impact of the sovereign stress. There are different reasons for 
the choice of CDS spreads rather than bond spreads. The fact of holding more information 
about the real sovereign stress is only one of them. Likewise, the arithmetic average of 
the 5-year CDS spreads of most worrisome countries in that field (Belgium, Spain, 
Portugal and Greece7) is representing the sovereign risk variable in the model. 
Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) 
PMI’s ability to predict changes in the manufacturing output and in the real economy as 
a whole makes it crucial for our model of bank excess returns. Although manufacturing 
is not a large component of GDP, it is in that sector where we actually see the first signals 
about recession and recovery. In general, manufacturing PMI values above and below 47, 
signal expansion periods and recession periods, respectively – see figure 2. It has proved 
to be a valuable tool for tracking the health of the economy.  
 
Figure 2 – Purchasing Managers’ Index. Data source: Bloomberg. 
                                                          
7 Ireland should also be included in the group of the countries that suffered the most severe CDS widening. 
However, due to data unavailability, this country was not taken into account when computing the arithmetic 
average. 
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Euribor – OIS spread (OIS spread) 
The 3-month Euribor OIS spread indicates how much trust banks place on each other. 
When looking at historical OIS values, one is able to infer about the rising and falling of 
credit risk in the markets – see figure 3. This explanatory variable of banking system’s 
stress is illustrating short-term funding conditions8.  
 
Figure 3 - Euribor-OIS spread. Data source: Bloomberg. 
 
Volatility Index (VIX) 
The Volatility Index measures the level of volatility based on S&P 500. It is widely 
known as the “fear gauge”, once it expresses the investors’ predictions of market volatility 
and risk in the near future. Often, when it exceeds 20% we are facing dismissing and 
uncertain times. On the other hand, values below 20% correspond to more complacent 
periods; see figure 4.  
                                                          
8 According to Chan-Lau, Liu and Schmittmann (2012), we could also have included the Option Adjusted 
Spread (OAS) for Eurobonds issued by global banks to account for long-term funding conditions. Once 
again, data unavailability has prevented us to include such variable or other alternative to stand for funding 
costs in the long-run. 
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Figure 4 - Volatility Index. Data source: Bloomberg. 
 
Industrial Production (IP) 
As a proxy for GDP, we added to our model the explanatory variable Industrial 
Production (expressed at constant prices of 2010). The goal is to study the impact of the 
economic conditions in bank returns. From the investor´s perspective, changes in the level 
of this economic indicator are associated with similar changes in the gross domestic 
output (GDP). 
Net exports (TradeJapan_EU and TradeEU-US) 
In order to measure the commercial balance health, I decided to introduce the variable 
Net Exports. It indicates the net balance between each two regions. Hence, we include 
two different variables: Net Exports Japan-Europe (net balance of exports from Japan to 
Europe and Imports to Japan from Europe) and the Net Exports Europe-US (reflecting 
the net balance of exports from Europe to US and Imports to Europe from US) – see 
figure 5. The decision to exclude the variable of trade between US and Japan is related to 
the fact that it does not add any explanatory power to the model.  
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Figure 5 – Net trade. Data source: Bloomberg 
 
Dummies: Financial Crisis and European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
Since the major purpose of the model is to test if there was a structural change in returns 
of the banking system due to the impact of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis in 
recovering from the Financial Crisis, we introduce two dummies to personate these two 
periods.  
The first dummy associated with the Financial Crisis takes the value 1 from August 2008 
onwards. The decision of the starting date was due to the fact that it was at that time that 
the collapse (or risk of collapse) of major financial institutions has set in. Although the 
bubble burst earlier, it was in the mid-2008 that global stock markets began to suffer large 
losses.9  
Regarding the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, the starting date to “turn the dummy 
active” was defined in May 2010. Even though rumours of problems with the Greek debt 
                                                          
9 In March 2008 the investment bank Bear Streams was rescued, and only six months later, in September, 
the Lehman Brothers failure strongly hit stock markets. 
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began to emerge in 2009, it was only in 2010 that such problems have become public10. 
When looking at figure 1, it is evident that the impact of the debt difficulties was mainly 
from May onwards.  
Extended Model – International Help Dummy 
For the purpose of lengthening the analysis, a second model was created. As in the 
previous case, the Arellano-Bond GMM panel-data estimator was used. The difference is 
that this second model takes into account the distinction between countries that have 
received rescue packages and the countries that have not. 
The first step consisted in identifying the EU-members that received rescue packages: 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (see Table 1). 
 
Country Time Span Bailout in total 
(billions of €) 
Greece May 2010 – Mar 2016 245,6 
Ireland Nov 2010 – Dec 2013 67,5 
Portugal May 2011 – May 2014 78 
Spain July 2012 – Dec 2014 41,4 
Table 1 – EU Emergency Measures. 
 
For each country, the dummy External_help assumes the value 1 in different dates, 
depending on the data in which the country under consideration asked for financial help. 
                                                          
10 In 2009 Greece recognized its problems with debt payment and refinancing. At the time, Greek budget 
deficit was around 13% of total GDP (against the 3% limit stated by the European Union). Several rating 
downgrades took place, driving up interest rates. 
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4 Results 
 
Table 2 - Panel-model estimation; output from STATA. 
 
Table 2 provides the results from the Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel Data estimation, 
using robust standard errors. As aforementioned, all independent variables are included 
in first differences. Most of the explanatory variables included are statistical significant, 
with the exception of the lag of the dependent variable (BankReturnsL1). CDS, PMI, OIS, 
VIX, IP, TradeJP_EU, TradeEU_US, Financial_crisis and EUSovdebt_crisis are all 
statistically significant at a 10% significance level. Also, when looking at the Wald test, 
it allows us to conclude for the overall significance of the regressors considered. 
Therefore, the negative impact of both the financial and the European sovereign debt 
crisis in the excess returns of the banking system worldwide is evident.  Moreover, when 
18 
 
comparing the statistical significance of both crises’ coefficients, we may say that the 
European sovereign debt crises seems to be affecting equity bank returns in a stronger 
way than the previous financial crisis of 2008.  
The unemployment rate was also included in the initial model, as a way of illustrating the 
economic cycle. Unfortunately, this variable was omitted due to collinearity problems. 
One possible explanation behind the collinearity of unemployment  may be the fact that 
its information is also expressed in other variables that measure the economic cycle 
(namely Industrial Production). Below I will analyse in detail all the significant variables 
of our model. 
CDS 
Since our panel data model is related with banks’ excess returns, the CDS variable seems 
to be of most importance. As previously mentioned, this variable is measuring sovereign 
risk, so a negative sign was expected. In fact, what the model tells us is that a higher 
sovereign stress/risk in the countries that experienced the most severe CDS widening 
according to Chan-Lau, Liu and Schimttmann (2012) (such as Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain and Belgium) affects negatively banks’ equity returns. Possible interpretations 
might be that creditworthiness deterioration impairs bank returns in general, since it 
implies losses on banks’ holdings of public debt and therefore harms banks’ balance 
sheets, reduces the value of collateral of those banks, and also leads to rating downgrades 
for banks situated in troubled countries11 (Poeck and Wijffelaars, 2012). 
 
                                                          
11 Poeack and Wijffelaars (2012) found that what matters in banks’ stock prices reduction is not as much 
the holding government debt of a trouble country but the residence of banks in that trouble country.  
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PMI 
The Purchasing Managers Index is positively related with banks’ excess returns. This 
happens because PMI is known for its ability to predict real GDP growth, not only in the 
manufacturing sector but in the economy as a whole. In this way, a positive change of 
this variable is associated with positive growth in real economic activity, thus improving 
banks’ equity returns. 
Euribor – OIS spread 
Surprisingly, results show a positive relationship between our measure of short term 
funding conditions and bank returns. As previously mentioned, Euribor-OIS spread 
indicates how banks view the creditworthiness of other banks. The higher the spread, the 
more expensive it is for banks to borrow from each other. Thus, higher values are related 
with uncertainty times (see figure 3), since a positive change of this variable tells us that 
credit market risk is increasing, setting more pressure on the banking system and 
jeopardizing banks’ excess returns. That is why we would expect rather a negative 
relationship. Possible explanations to the unexpected positive sign may be related with 
several factors, like the inclusion of variables in our model that may already capture the 
same signals as the Euribor-OIS spread does. 
VIX 
In what concerns investor sentiment, its coefficient is very low and somehow surprising, 
due to its positive sign. Actually, a negative coefficient was expected, since this contrarian 
indicator usually has an inverse relationship with the market. As explained before, a high 
VIX is related with investor fear, whereas a low VIX reflects a market that is rallying. 
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One possible explanation for the positive coefficient achieved may be the fact that higher 
volatility often reflects higher returns.  
IP 
Our measure of economic wealth, the Industrial Production, shows a positive coefficient 
relation with bank returns. Since IP is a useful tool when assessing economic performance 
for a given country, it is not surprising that positive changes would affect positively 
bank’s excess returns. One potential explanation is related with the fact that increases in 
Industrial Production lead to increases of the economic activity, therefore resulting in 
higher earnings or profits.  Hereupon, investors start to revaluate stock returns (in a more 
favourable way), resulting in higher returns (Young, 2006). 
TradeJP_EU, TradeEU_US 
In what concerns the coefficient of the net trade between Japan and Europe (i.e., exports 
from Japan to Europe minus imports to Japan from Europe), our model suggests a positive 
relationship with this variable and banks’ excess returns. When looking at figure 5, one 
may see that there is no sudden rise or fall of the net trade in the crises periods. Thus, we 
cannot infer deep conclusions about how this variable affects bank returns.  
The other variable concerning the net trade (TradeEU_US) is related with exports from 
Europe to US minus imports to Europe and from the US. Likewise the previous case, one 
cannot reach significant conclusions from the negative sign of the coefficient. When 
looking at figure 5, it seems that there is no clear relationship between that variable and 
bank equity returns. 
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Financial Crisis 
The so called Great Recession of the modern times (2008 Financial Crisis) severely 
weakened the whole economy, with higher emphasis on the profitability of the banking 
system. Therefore, and as expected, the Financial Crisis dummy shows a negative 
relationship with our dependent variable. Furthermore, the statistical significance of this 
dummy reinforces the theory that there was in fact a structural change in the performance 
of bank returns in the outbreak of the financial crisis. 
 As the main drivers of trouble conditions, one can highlight the irresponsible mortgage 
lending (firstly in the United States, enhancing the growth of the housing bubble), easy 
credit provisions, weak and fraudulent underwriting practices, and incorrect pricing of 
risk. Moreover, low interest rates created incentives for both banks and investors to look 
for riskier assets that offered higher and seductive returns. 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
The statistical significance of the dummy associated with the European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis reflects the second structural change in the banking system performance. Although 
in 2009 Greece began to have serious debt problems, one may say that the official crisis 
started only in 2010, clearly affecting bank stock returns in a more severe way in October 
of that year. Actually, banking crises are often preceded by the rapidly rising of indebtness 
(Reinhart am Rogoff, 2011). As expected, the sovereign debt crisis has been affecting 
strongly and negatively bank equity returns through many different channels. This 
reinforces our theory that after the 2008 financial crash, bank returns worldwide started 
recovering, with the exception of Europe, due to the burst of the debt crisis.  
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In situations of debt problems, when the dummy assumes the value 1, governments have 
no alternative other than fiscal consolidation (through either high taxes or lower public 
spending).  Thus, non-performing loans rise whereas asset price fall, both worsening the 
asset quality and capitalization of banks (Poeck and Wijffelaars, 2012). There is clear 
evidence that the financial crisis had evolved into a sovereign debt crisis. 
Extended Model – Financial Help 
 
Table 3- Extended panel-model estimation; Output from STATA. 
 
Table 3 provides the extended model, embodying the dummy variable related with 
countries that received external help. The results show a statistical significance (at a 10% 
significance level) of all the variables in this new model, keeping the same signals of their 
coefficients. Also, the Wald test confirms the overall significance of the model.  
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The statistical significance of the dummy External_help gives emphasis to the theory that 
asking for financial help had impact on banks’ equity returns of the countries who did it. 
Although the coefficient is low, there is a clear distinction between countries that receive 
EU Emergency Measures and the countries that had not. Actually, when looking at the 
sign of the dummy coefficient, one may say that the impact of the rescue programs had 
in fact contributed to bank returns recovery.  
5 Conclusions 
This article’s objective is to study if there was a structural change in equity returns of the 
banking system due to the outbreak of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, supporting 
the tightening nexus between banks and sovereigns.  
To carry out my analysis, I performed a GMM Arellano-Bond panel model estimation 
using Bank’s excess returns as the dependent variable and taking into consideration 
several other variables that may affect the performance of the banking sector worldwide. 
The sample under analysis covers eleven countries (9 EU member-states, Japan and 
United States) and ranges from January 2006 to June 2013. 
The main conclusions of the regression model rely on the fact that there was indeed a 
structural change in bank returns performance due to recent crises’ impact. This is 
expressed by the statistically significance of the two dummies included (each related with 
each crisis). Actually, from 2010 onwards stock markets worldwide began to recover 
from the 2008 Financial Crisis, with the exception of Europe, which was hit by problems 
in repaying and refinancing its debt. The statistical significance of the explanatory 
variables included (namely CDS spread, EURIBOR-OIS spread and VIX) reinforces the 
importance of restoring market confidence. 
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 In what concerns the extended model (the one accounting for the distinction between 
countries who asked for financial help and countries that did not) we can infer three main 
conclusions. First, rescue packages had a significant impact on the banking returns of the 
countries who had implemented it. Second, and as expected, the impact is positive, 
reflecting that such measures have contributed to improve the performance of the banking 
system in countries who had implemented them. Third, since those countries are still 
presenting bank weaknesses, we may conclude that the financial support given was not 
enough to restore complete confidence in the market.  
Finally, our analysis remits us to the importance of risk management in the banking 
activity. Effective management of risk protects economies and investors from sudden 
shocks and unwelcome surprises. One of the top priorities is to break the link between 
banks and sovereigns, preventing spillover effects in turmoil periods. 
Moreover, it is crucial to have authorities capable of ensuring that rules are correctly 
observed. Otherwise, no rescue plan will be efficient in improving the whole health of the 
banking sector.  
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